A Small Party Started Brexit. Is a Small Party the Antidote?

On March 10, 2019 By admin

• Breaking News

In 1988, Austrian philosopher Karl Popper argued in The Economist that the two-party system is the most democratic: Proportional representation, which encourages minority and coalition governments, gives undue power to small parties, who can threaten to leave and destroy a ruling coalition if their platforms aren’t prioritized.

Nearly three decades later, the greatest political event in recent British history, Brexit, would be orchestrated by a party that hardly made it into Parliament—all while two-party rule remained virtually intact.

The hard-right Eurosceptic U.K. Independence Party only ever managed to elect one Member of Parliament in the Commons, even though it commanded 12.6 percent of the vote in the 2015 national elections. (The U.K.’s electoral system grants a district’s Parliament seats to the party with the most votes in each district, favoring the two largest parties, Labour and the Conservatives, and keeping small parties like UKIP at bay. Popper would have approved.) And yet, UKIP is arguably the party with the greatest political impact in recent British history: The threat it seemed to pose to the Conservative party in the 2015 elections was widely believed to be the deciding factor in David Cameron’s promise of a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU.

Last month, three Conservatives and eight Labour members formed a new “Independent Group,” with aspirations to become a full political party, as their spokesman recently declared. The group is fiercely pro-EU—some members have long wanted a second referendum—and argues that the U.K.’s two-party system is broken. Could this be the antidote to UKIP, another small single-issue party, pressuring both Labour and the Conservatives to undo Brexit’s damage, under the threat of enticing other MPs (and eventually voters) to join them?

The seven Labour MPs who resigned from the party on February 18 cited anti-Semitism within the Labour party and a lack of trust in leader Jeremy Corbyn, especially when it comes to handling Brexit, as their reasons for leaving. An eighth Labour MP joined the following day. A few days later, three Conservative MPs made their own break, citing the hijacking of the Conservative party by hard-right elements, Theresa May’s failure to modernize the party, and the reckless handling of Brexit.

Small, narrowly focused parties have a history of successful issue advocacy, if not necessarily long-term parliamentary success. Beyond UKIP’s role in the Brexit vote there is the example of Germany’s Green party, which though founded as an irreverent activist party, went on to gain parliamentary representation, exerting tremendous sway on politics in the 1980s: The Greens are currently absorbing voters from the decaying center-left and center-right governing parties. The Dutch Party for the Animals, PvdP, even with limited parliamentary representation, has also been able to guide the animal welfare policies of mainstream parties, given its ability to absorb voters from both sides of the political spectrum.

Whether The Independent Group can do something similar is debatable. The group’s statement promises “evidence-based” policies that reach beyond traditional divisions in pursuit of the national interest. A list of similarly anodyne declarations follows. “The barriers of poverty, prejudice and discrimination facing individuals should be removed and advancement occur on the basis of merit,” one proclamation begins. One would be hard-pressed to find MPs from any party that disagree.

A certain vagueness is perhaps to be expected from a group composed of both center-left and center-right politicians. And perhaps there is a gap in the U.K.’s political market for such a centrist party. A familiar narrative since the 2016 referendum has been that both main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, have been drifting to the wings, leaving a large portion of the electorate feeling unrepresented and without a viable alternative. Others feel poorly represented due to the fact that, even though 48 percent of the electorate voted to Remain in the EU, both major parties have committed to Brexit. The Liberal Democrats, who would have been the obvious go-to middle-ground, pro-EU party, have been unattractive to center-left voters, their brand seriously damaged in the years it governed in coalition with the Conservatives, enabling austerity measures and the tripling of university fees. Center-right voters have also been reluctant to cast their vote to the Liberal Democrats, for fear of aiding Jeremy Corbyn’s ascent to power, given how close the race between Labour and the Conservatives is in many districts, and the UK’s “first past the post” electoral system.

The prospect of a new center party has surfaced before, particularly in the spring of 2018, when a fund of £50 million was said to have been raised by entrepreneurs, and philanthropists with the aim to “break the Westminster mould.” Those plans never materialized, but TIG now seems like the product of similar machinations. Some have argued this could be Britain’s Macron moment, referring to the rise of Emanuel Macron in France, where a group of political entrepreneurs created a new force that quickly won support. (TIG is already polling at 14 to 18 percent.) Others, however, see the group as the dying whimpers of centrist politics that’s had its day. After all, the U.K. already had its Macron: His name was Tony Blair.

The most conspicuous thing about the new group is the deafening absence of the issue without which it would not have existed—opposition to Brexit—in its official platform. The group clearly does not want to be perceived as being a single-issue party.

The reluctance to be branded the anti-Brexit party is understandable. Brexit-ennui has set in with many voters, who just want it to be over with. Furthermore, Brexit is bound to happen within the next few months, thus potentially robbing an anti-Brexit party of its raison d’être—as happened with UKIP, spiraling into decay ever since their only real policy became imminent reality.

But TIG should not shy away from its core anti-Brexit identity, for there lies its strength. Already there are signs that the group’s very existence might be influencing both Labour and the Conservatives to soften their stance on Brexit. Despite parliamentary debate over a second referendum having been a key Labour commitment this past fall, Corbyn seemed to have all but forgotten—literally so in a recent letter to the prime minister—about the option. But just days after The Independent Group’s founding, he came out explicitly in favor of one. On the Conservatives’ side, May had categorically ruled out the possibility of delaying the Brexit date of March 29, but has now agreed to a vote in Parliament that would allow such a delay in case her deal is rejected once again on March 12.

Moreover, while Brexit is almost certainly bound to happen sooner or later, that’s hardly the end of the debate over the U.K.’s relationship with Europe. Post-Brexit UK-EU relations will continue to be at the top of the political agenda for years to come. A new pro-EU party luring voters from both Labour and the Conservatives could steer the government, and the opposition, towards a closer relationship with the continent.

Popper might have seen this as a disproportionate intervention on democratic politics. But in a country split down the middle on the question of Europe, with neither of the two major parties giving voice to the pro-Europe half, democracy could be salvaged rather than compromised by a party like TIG.

It’s Five Minutes to Midnight in the UK

On March 10, 2019 By admin

• Breaking News

LONDON—The week ahead will be one of the most dramatic in British politics in decades. A sequence of parliamentary votes will decide the future of the British economy—or perhaps plunge it into chaos.

The government of Theresa May will one more time resubmit to Parliament an agreement to transition out of the European Union over the next two years. That agreement is widely disliked in Parliament and could well lose again.

In that case, Parliament will face the prospect of crashing out of the EU without a deal on March 29, a prospect that terrifies just about everybody.

The likeliest alternative then would be a humbling request to the EU for a delay of the March 29 deadline to allow Britain more time to get its act together.

Or very possibly something entirely different could happen—a heart-stopping game of roulette with the world’s sixth-largest economy. (It was fifth, just a year ago, but the post-Brexit collapse in the value of the pound against the Euro has elevated France ahead of the UK.)

As Britain and Europe brace against the future, maybe it’s worthwhile to reassess how they arrived at this impasse.

In the background of Brexit loom the economic troubles that have discredited elites across the western world. The financial crisis of 2008 hit the United Kingdom even harder than the United States—and did damage that has proven more enduring. As of the end of 2018, average wages in the UK remain well below their 2007 peak.

Yet the European Union looks like no bargain in comparison. The Euro currency crisis that struck in 2010—and the harsh austerity measures imposed to stabilize the currency afterward—shadowed the appeal of EU membership. Not until 2017 did Eurozone employment recover to pre-crisis levels; even now, the Eurozone unemployment rate is more than double the UK’s 4.0 percent. Where once the EU offered itself as a protective alternative to savage American-style capitalism, post-2010, the EU looked savage itself.  

Recession and austerity on both sides of the channel enabled Brexit. A sequence of political decisions by British and European leaders triggered it.

The first trigger was the unexpectedly poor performance of the Conservatives in the British election of 2010. That election should have yielded a big Conservative win. The UK economy remained in bad shape after the 2009 crash. Labour had held office for 13 years. It was time for change. Yet the Conservatives failed to secure a majority.

That failure forced Conservative leader David Cameron into a sequence of desperate political maneuvers. To win right-of-center votes from the UK Independence Party, Cameron in January 2013 made the fateful commitment to hold a referendum on Europe in a second Conservative mandate. Cameron accepted that risk in part because a previous desperate maneuver had inspired over-confidence. To woo the Liberal Democrats into a coalition with him in 2010, Cameron had agreed to hold a referendum on a new voting system for the United Kingdom. Conservatives fiercely opposed the change and would have been badly injured by it—but they accepted the referendum anyway as the price of power. In 2011, they gambled and won. British voters rejected proposals to change how their votes were tallied. Having tempted fate once, why not try again—especially after the Conservative-favored “No” side again prevailed in the September 2014 referendum on Scottish independence. It certainly seemed that while the forces of change might talk and talk, the British public preferred stability.

Cameron won his majority in the UK general elections of May 2015. From then on, however, events broke against him.

In August 2015, Germany opened its doors to an inrush of asylum seekers from the Middle East, West Africa, and South Asia. By the time the doors were closed again, 1.2 million people had gained residency rights in Germany. Once those new residents gained German citizenship, they would be entitled under EU rules to move to the United Kingdom. Under the UK’s own roles, they could then claim social benefits, including free health care.  

The pro-Brexit historian and political analyst Andrew Roberts believes that this decision by Merkel accounted for the Leave side’s victory in the referendum 10 months later.

The next break occurred a month later. In September 2015, Jeremy Corbyn won the leadership of the Labour Party. Corbyn had been an obscure figure till then, a Labour backbencher who espoused cranky far-left causes—including denouncing the European Union as a cabal of international bankers. The five previous Labour leaders—every leader since 1983—had favored EU membership. So had all the leading candidates in the 2015 contest. Corbyn’s unexpected triumph muted the Labour Party’s longstanding pro-European message. Corbyn refused to campaign alongside Liberal and Conservative leaders for a Remain vote—and even took a holiday in the middle of the referendum campaign.   

Cameron threw himself into negotiations with the European Union to gain something that could be represented as a “win” for Britain. He got something, but not enough to satisfy critics—especially not in the jingoistic print media that does so much to form non-elite British public opinion. “Cameron’s EU Deal Is a JOKE,” headlined the Daily Express. “THE GREAT DELUSION!” blared the Daily Mail adding, “PM hails EU ‘reforms,’ but critics say they’ll do nothing to curb migration and will trigger years of benefits chaos.” The Sun story was spread under the title, “IT STINKS.”

This media repudiation of Cameron’s achievements in Brussels in the spring of 2016 empowered the Leave forces in the Brexit referendum in June 2016.

Yet defeat in the Brexit referendum did not deprive Cameron of all power to shape events. “Leave” could mean many different things. Margaret Thatcher had wanted Britain inside Europe’s single market but outside its political institutions. Cameron could have interpreted the result as a mandate for the Thatcher policy. Or he could have played for time, called for study, and then presented options to the British public in a second referendum sometime later. Instead, he resigned on June 24.

Cameron’s successor, Theresa May, had supposedly voted Remain. But she quickly decided she had more politically to fear from the Leavers and arch-Leavers in her caucus. Appeasing them would become her top political priority. She launched her leadership campaign on July 11, 2016, with a speech declaring: “Brexit means Brexit.” Britain would quit the EU’s political institutions. It would quit the single market. It would quit the customs union. It would then negotiate for everything it wanted from Europe—and, she promised, get it, too.

It’s tough to negotiate with a 27-member entity. By nature, committees are slow. The Leavers and arch-Leavers in May’s caucus got restive, and she panicked. Lacking even the outline of a deal, she announced in October 2016 that she would trigger the two-year process to quit the EU no later than the end of the first quarter of 2017. On March 29, 2017, she honored her promise.

In order to strengthen her hand against the Leavers and arch-Leavers in her caucus, May called elections for June 2017. She asked the voters for a mandate for “strong and stable leadership.” Instead, they took away her parliamentary majority. She lost 13 seats, and found herself and her government more dependent on marginal MPs than ever before.

What ensued instead was a vacillating shambles, horrifyingly detailed by the political editor of the Sunday Times, Tim Shipman, in a granular history of the first year of the May government, Fall Out. May created a special cabinet department to oversee negotiations with the EU. It instantly disintegrated into “a total and utter shambles.” Officials were left in ignorance of what they were supposed to achieve. “It could be anything … They didn’t really know where to start.” “A big part of the job for officials was educating politicians about the implications of the political narrative they had established.” The cabinet minister May selected to oversee negotiations was described by a civil servant who worked with him: “He thought he knew a lot but most of what he’d written was wrong in some way: legally, diplomatically, or just plain not correct.” “What is undeniable is that ministers concealed the potential problems from the public … It was not necessary to be a fully paid up Remainer to conclude that May might have been better to level with the public about the challenges she faced.”

But it’s hard to level with people about things you yourself don’t know and don’t understand. It’s five minutes to midnight in the UK. Brexit will mean Brexit. The British government and the British people are about to learn the hard way the real-world content of that rhetorical tautology.